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Intent or Impact: Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In enacting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 Congress 
declared that it would no longer tolerate discrimination in federally-
funded programs.2 Title VI provides, in part, that "[n]o person in 
the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance."3 Given the broad range of 
programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance,4 it is 
not surprising that title VI has become an important weapon in the 
fight against discrimination.5 
Despite its sweeping language, the scope of title Vi's prohibition 
has been hotly debated. "One of the great unsettled questions of 
civil rights law"6 is whether plaintiffs must prove discriminatory in-
tent7 to establish a violation of title VI. 8 Plaintiffs have argued that 
proof of the discriminatory impact of a federally funded program 
I. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-05, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-
2000d-6 (1976)). 
2. See, e.g., 110 CONG. R.Ec. 1520-21 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id at 6543-47 (re-
marks of Senator Humphrey); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26, reprinted in 
(1963) U.S. CooE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2400-01 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE JUDICIARY 
REPORT]. . 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Section 2000d-l provides that§ 2000d's prohibition extends 
to any program or activity receiving federal assistance by way of grant, loan, or contract other 
than a contract of insurance or guaranty. 
4. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CML RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE Pul!LICATION No. 22, HEW 
AND TITLE VI 1-4 (1970). 
S. The Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether there is a private cause of 
action under title VI, but most courts that have considered the issue, including the Supreme 
Court, have either assumed or concluded that title VI confers a private cause of action. See, 
e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Calv. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978); 438 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); NAACP v. 
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane); Montgomery Improvement Assn. 
v. United States Dept. of HUD, 645 F.2d 291,295 (5th Cir. 1981); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. 
Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). 
6. Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 299 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). 
7. A discriminatory intent standard requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted 
out of racial animus. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
8. This issue has been the subject of considerable scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Aber-
nathy, Title VI and t/te Constitution: A Regulatory Model far Defining "Discrimination," 70 
GEO. LJ. 1 (1981); Benjes, Heubert & O'Brian, The Legality of Minimum Competency Test 
Programs Under Tille VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, IS HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 537 
(1980); Note, The Prima Facie Case and Remedies in Title VI Hospital Relocation Cases, 65 
CORNELL L. REv. 689 (1980); Note, Maintaining Health Care in the Inner City: Title VI and 
Hospital Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 271 (1980); Note, Title VL· The Impact/Intent Debate 
Enters the Municipal Services Arena, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124 (1980); Note, NAA Cl' v. Medi-
cal Center, Inc. : The Evidentiary Hearing Under Title VI, 24 ST. Loms U. L.J. 579 (1980). 
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should suffice to establish a prima facie violation.9 Since an impact 
standard avoids the formidable problem of proving the defendant's 
subjective motivations, it is far more appealing to plaintiffs than an 
intent standard.10 The Supreme Court upheld a finding of discrimi-
nation based on administrative regulations that incorporated an im-
pact standard in Lau v. Nichols, 11 but language in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke12 suggested that title VI prohibits 
only intentional discrimination. Confronted with ambiguous gui-
dance from the Supreme Court, some courts have adopted an intent 
standard, 13 while others have opted for an impact test. 14 
This Note analyzes the controversy and concludes that courts 
must apply an impact standard in title VI cases. After reviewing the 
relevant Supreme Court decisions, Part I contends that Bakke did 
not overrule Lau's approval of an impact standard. Part II examines 
the regulations on which the Lau court relied. It first characterizes 
them as legislative; they derive the force oflaw from an explicit con-
gressional delegation of substantive power. Part II then tests the reg-
ulations' impact standard against the language, legislative history, 
and policy of title VI and finds it valid. Since courts may not disre-
gard valid legislative regulations, this Note concludes that an impact 
standard governs title VI litigation. 
9. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane). A 
disparate impact standard is satisfied by a showing that the challenged action, even if facially 
neutral, falls more harshly on a protected group. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
431 (1971). 
10. The Supreme Court has indicated that discriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the impact of a challenged action. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) 
("Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of 
the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race 
than another."); 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Frequently the most probative 
evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence 
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to 
have intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of 
governmental action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective decision-
making, and of mixed motivation."). This, of course, narrows the practical diJference between 
the intent and impact standards. 
II. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
13. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
102 S. Ct. 981 (1981) (court's holding that plaintiff must establish discriminatory intent in suit 
brought under title IX based on analysis of title VI); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 
50 U.S.L.W. 3528 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (no. 81-431); Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d 
Cir. 1980); Parent Assn. of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 
1979); Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1979). 
14. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane); 
Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979), ajfd on other grounds, 620 F.2d 680 
(8th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978). Only the 
NAACP opinion fully confronts the Bakke decision. 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S .AMBIGUOUS GUIDANCE 
In Lau v. Nichols, 15 the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that 
the San Francisco school system's failure to provide supplemental 
education to Chinese-speaking children constituted discrimination in 
violation of title VI. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on 
regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) pursuant to title VI. 16 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Douglas emphasized that HEW's regulations ''barred [discrimi-
nation] which has that effect even though no purposeful design is 
present."17 Those regulations, moreover, required that school sys-
tems take "affirmative steps" to rectify language deficiencies that 
"exclude national origin-minority group children from effective par-
ticip~tion in the educational program."18 Noting that "[t]he Federal 
Government has power to fix the terms on which its money allot-
ments to the States shall be disbursed"19 and that the San Francisco 
school system was contractually obligated to comply with both title 
VI and HEW's regulations, Justice Douglas concluded that the 
school system had to comply with the regulations and provide sup-
plemental education or face l:l. cutoff of federal funds. 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion also stressed the importance 
of HEW's title VI enforcement regulations. After asserting that title 
VI alone might not require the termination of federal funding absent 
a showing that the school system had discriminated intentionally,20 
Justice Stewart stated that the "critical question" was whether 
HEW's regulations, which clearly adopted an impact standard and 
which required the provision of supplemental education,21 exceeded 
the authority granted by title VI.22 Justice Stewart applied the stan-
dard established by previous decisions23 - agency regulations will 
be sustained if they are "reasonably related to the purposes of the 
enabling legislation"24 - and concluded that HEW's regulations 
were valid.25 
15. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
16. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (1973). 
17. 414 U.S. at 5~8 (emphasis in original). 
18. 414 U.S. at 568 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)). 
19. 414 U.S. at 569. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that Congress can 
condition the receipt of federal funds on the observance of federal statutory and administrative 
directives. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,474 (1980); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. 
Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). 
20. 414 U.S. at 569-70 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
21. 45 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1973). 
22. 414 U.S. at 571. 
23. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing 
Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969). 
24. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 
268, 280-8 I (1969)). 
25. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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The Lau Court's reliance on HEW's impact standard to establish 
a statutory violation coupled with the absence of any constitutional 
analysis26 suggested that title VI and the equal protection clause27 
were independent prohibitions against discrimination. Four years 
later, however, the validity of this conclusion was cast into doubt 
by the Court's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,28 a case that involved both constitutional and statutory chal-
lenges to a medical school's affirmative action admissions program.29 
In Bakke, Justice Powell, writing separately, and Justice Brennan, 
joined by three other Justices, held that certain kinds of admissions 
programs favoring minorities would pass constitutional muster.30 
Finding evidence in title VI's massive legislative history31 indicating 
that Congress meant to prohibit discrimination no more broadly 
than does the Constitution itself, these Justices agreed in dicta that 
such programs were also permissible under title VI. 32 Since the 
Court had previously held that the Constitution prohibits only inten-
tional discrimination,33 some courts have interpreted Bakke as over-
ruling Lau and have required a showing of discriminatory intent in 
all title VI litigation. 34 
This argument is plausible, but three elements of Bakke indicate 
that Lau remains viable. First, neither Justice Powell nor Justice 
26. The decision's statutory basis obviated the need for any consideration of the plaintiffs' 
equal protection claim. See 414 U.S. at 566. 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
29. Plaintiff Alan Bakke alleged that the special admissions program of the University of 
California at Davis Medical School violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment and§ 601 of title VI. 438 U.S. at 276-78. Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun upheld the constitutionality of certain types of affirmative action plans, 
while a separate majority composed of Justices Powell, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens, 
Stewart, and Rehnquist held that Bakke's constitutional rights had been violated and ordered 
his admission to medical school 
30. 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, JJ.). 
31. Title VI was enacted as one part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
§§ 101-1106, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-20000h-6 (1976, Supp. II 1978 
& Supp. IV 1980). References to title VI are scattered throughout the legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act, which occupies hundreds of pages of the Congressional Record, see 110 
CONG. REc. Jndex (1964), and includes more than three thousand pages of congressional hear-
ings. See, e.g., Civil Rights - The President's Program, 1963: Hearings Be.fare the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1963); Civil Rights: Hearings Be.fare Suhcomm. 
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
32. 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Title VI must be held to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amend-
ment."); 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) ("Title VI prohibits 
only the uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a 
State or its agencies . . . ."). 
33. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). 
34. See authorities cited in note 13 supra. 
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Brennan expressed any desire to overrule Lau.35 Although Justice 
Brennan acknowledged that the thrust of his argument - that title 
VI prohibits discrimination no more broadly than the Constitution 
- appeared to contradict the premise of Lau, 36 he later cited Lau for 
the proposition that HEW's regulations "are entitled to considerable 
deference in construing title VI."37 It was "most significant," Justice 
Brennan believed, that these regulations authorized and in some 
cases required institutions to adopt affirmative action programs.38 
The target of the remedial regulations in Lau was the discriminatory 
impact of the school system's conduct; there was no evidence of dis-
criminatory intent. In noting the Lau remedy with approval, Justice 
Brennan confirmed that discriminatory impact can suffice to estab-
lish a title VI violation. Justice Powell also confronted Lau expressly 
but he chose to distinguish rather than overrule it, emphasizing the 
absence in Bakke of any "determination by the legislature or a re-
sponsible administrative agency that the University engaged in a dis-
criminatory practice requiring remedial efforts."39 
Second, the Court focused on entirely different issues in Lau and 
Bakke. The issue in Lau was whether proof of disparate impact was 
sufficient to state a claim under title VI 40 In Bakke, however, the 
Court had no occasion to consider whether impact alone was action-
able under title VI since the medical school had intentionally ex-
cluded the plaintiff in favor of minority applicants.41 The Bakke 
Court only needed to analyze different kinds of intentional discrimi-
nation. Any consideration of de facto discrimination would have 
been superfluous. 
The Court's attention to the remedial purpose of title VI is a final 
element of Bakke that supports Lau's continuing viability. Both Jus-
tice Powell and Justice Brennan expressly noted Congress' interest in 
remedying past discrimination against minorities.42 The Justices' 
35. See 438 U.S. at 303-05 (Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, JJ.). 
36. 438 U.S. at 352. 
37. 438 U.S. at 343. 
38. 438 U.S. at 343. It may seem anomalous to argue that title Vi's enforcement regula-
tions can properly forbid disparate impact and yet permit affirmative action plans. Yet the 
same concept has been embraced by the Supreme Court in interpreting title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Title VII, a companion provision to 
title VI that prohibits employment discrimination in similar terms, forbids facially neutral 
employment practices that have a disparate impact unjustified by business necessity, see 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), but allows private voluntary affirmative 
action plans, see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
39. 438 U.S. at 304-05. 
40. See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying text. 
41. See 438 U.S. at 289 n.27. 
42. See 438 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Black-
mun, JJ.). 
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dicta limiting title VI's prohibition to the constitutional standard was 
motivated by their concern that title VI might otherwise be read to 
prohibit affirmative action programs. Such a reading of title VI, the 
petitioner had warned, ''would tum a charter of liberty into an in-
strument of exclusion from opportunities central to American life."43 
In expressly declining to consider the issue in Board of Education 
v. Harris,44 the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that Bakke 
did not settle the question whether a showing of disparate impact 
alone establishes a valid title VI claim.45 The Harris majority ob-
served in dicta that Congress might have intended to establish an 
intent standard in title VI, because "[a] violation of title VI may re-
sult in a cutoff of all federal funds, and it is likely that Congress 
would wish this drastic result only when the discrimination is inten-
tional."46 But title VI incorporates procedural mechanisms designed 
to ensure that federal funds are not withdrawn drastically. While a 
title VI violation may lead to the cutoff of all federal funding, the 
statute provides that the relevant agency must first attempt to secure 
voluntary compliance.47 Failing that, the agency must file reports 
with the appropriate House and Senate Committees providing thirty 
days' notice of its intention to terminate funding.48 Given these stat-
utory safeguards, it is not clear that narrowing the range of conduct 
that title VI proscribes by imposing an intent standard is necessary to 
prevent "drastic" funding cutoffs. The Harris Court, moreover, ig-
nored the fact that title VI plaintiffs normally seek to enjoin future 
discrimination or reductions in services rather than to force the ter-
mination of federal funding. 49 
In sum, Lau established that title VI regulations incorporating an 
impact standard are consistent with the statute. While language in 
43. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 6, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978), reprinted in 100 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
nm UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683 (1978). 
44. 444 U.S. 130 (1979). 
45. 440 U.S at 149. Harris involved a challenge to HEW's authority to employ a disparate 
impact standard of discrimination under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), 20 U.S,C. 
§§ 3193-3207 (Supp. II 1978). The Court upheld the validity of a disparate impact standard 
under the ESAA and concluded that there was no need to consider whether a showing of 
disparate impact would also establish a vio~tion of title VI. 
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court discussed with approval its hold• 
ing in Lau that HEW regulations adopting a disparate impact standard are a constitutional 
exercise of Congress' power under the spending clause. 448 U.S. at 479. F11/lllove indicates 
that the Court still considers Lau to be good law. It is significant that Justices White and 
Powell joined the opinion of the Court, since they were among the five Justices who indicated 
in Bak/ce that title VI requires a showing of discriminatory intent. 
46. 444 U.S. at 150. 
47. 45 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976). 
48. 45 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976). 
49. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1339 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) 
(Adams, J., concurring). 
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Bakke may have created doubt, courts should not interpret that de-
cision as an obstacle to enforcing these regulations. Part II more 
closely examines the regulations in light of the language, legislative 
history, and policy of title VI. It concludes that agency regulations 
issued under title VI, as valid legislative rules having the force of 
law, bind courts to an impact standard. 
II. AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH 
Administrative agencies issue two types of rules and regulations. 
Interpretative regulations "advise the public of the agency's con-
struction of the statutes and rules which it administers."50 Legisla-
tive regulations "are issued pursuant to statutory authority and 
implement the statute; they create law just as the statute itself does, 
by changing existing rights and obligations."51 The difference be-
tween these two types of regulations has significant implications for 
courts reviewing agency actions. Valid legislative regulations are 
binding on courts, 52 but interpretative regulations are merely entitled 
to deference in varying degrees depending on the facts of the partic-
ular case. 53 
In deciding whether a particular agency regulation is legislative 
or interpretative, it is important to recall that "[t]he legislative power 
of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of 
quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agen-
cies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress."54 
When Congress delegates its legislative power, the administrative 
regulations promulgated by the responsible agency are legislative 
rather than interpretative and have "the force and effect of law."55 
Congress delegates substantive law-making authority ~o administra-
50. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979) (quoting ATrORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 30 n.3 (1947)). The Court noted 
that "[i]n prior cases, we have given some weight to the Attorney General's Manual • . . since 
the Justice Department was heavily involved in the legislative process that resulted in the Act's 
enactment in 1946." 441 U.S. at 302 n.31. 
51. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 154 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., 
Herweg v. Ray, 50 U.S.L.W. 4205, 4207 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281, 295 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). 
52. See authorities cited in note 56 infra. 
53. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (''The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will 
depend on the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its con-
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control")). See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE§ 7.14 (2d ed. 1979). 
54. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979). 
55. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979) (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 
432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977)). See, e.g., Herweg v. Ray, SO U.S.L.W. 4205, 4207 (Feb. 23, 
1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Commn., 554 F.2d 1140, 1153-54 
&nn.24-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 2K. DAVIS,supra note 53, at§ 7.8; B. ScHWARTZ,supra note 51, 
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tive agencies via statute.56 Thus courts must scrutinize pertinent 
statutory language before characterizing regulations as legislative or 
interpretative. 
When one applies these principles to title VI, the clarity of Con-
gress' delegation of legislative authority is striking. Section 602 of 
title VI provides that "[e]ach Federal department and agency which 
is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program 
or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions 
. . . of this title . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of gen-
eral applicability . . . ."57 Shortly after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was enacted, a presidential task force58 produced model title VI en-
forcement regulations specifying, in part, that recipients of federal 
funds may not use "criteria or methods of administration which have 
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or "the effect 
of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objec-
tives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, 
color, or national origin."59 These regulations were soon adopted by 
seven agencies60 and have now been promulgated by at least fifty-
two federal agencies,61 including every Cabinet department.62 Since 
section 602 not only authorizes but commands federal agencies to 
issue regulations enforcing title VI's policy of nondiscrimination, the 
enforcement regulations are legislative. 
The Supreme Court has generally been content to state, without 
further explanation, that legislative regulations are those issued pur-
suant to explicit statutory authority, 63 but language in General Elec-
at- 148-49; Koch, .Public Procedures far the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General 
Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. LJ. 1047, 1047-49 & nn.4-10 (1976). 
56. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at§ 7.8; authorities cited in note 55 supra; cf. General 
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S 125, 140-42 (1976) (distinguishing Congress' failure in title VII to 
confer rulemaking authority on administrative agency from "regulations which under the en-
abling statute may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability"). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976). 
58. See Co=ent, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Implementation and Impact, 
36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 845-46 (1968). 
59. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964) ·(emphasis added). 
60. 29 Fed. Reg. 16,273-309 (1964) (Dept of Interior; Dept of Agricul~ure; Dept. of Labor; 
Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; General Services Administration; Housing and 
Home Finance Agency; and the National Science Foundation). 
61. See C.F.R. Index (July l, 1981) at 84-86. 
62. Dept. of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1981); Dept. of Energy, 10 C.F.R. 
§ 1040.13(c), (d) (1981); Dept of the Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 17.3(b)(2), (3) (1981); Dept. of State, 
22 C.F.R. § 14I.3(b)(2) (1981); Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R. 
§ I.4(2)(i), (3) (1981); Dept of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 42.l04(b)(2), (3) (1980); Dept. ofLabor, 29 
C.F.R. § 31.3(b)(2), (3) (1981); Dept of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(4) (1981); Dept. of 
Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 300.4(b)(2) (1981); Dept of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1980); 
Dept of Co=erce, 15 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2) (1981); Dept of Health and Human Services, 45 
C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2), (3) (1980); Dept of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2), (3) (1981). 
63. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 54. See authorities cited in note 55 supra. 
The relationship between the nature of legislative regulations and their statutory origin 
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tric Co. v. Gilhert64 supports the proposition that title VI regulations 
are legislative. In Gilbert, the Court held that title VII did not confer 
law-making power on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC).65 Accordingly, the EEOC's employment discrimina-
tion guidelines were interpretative and entitled only to 
"consideration."66 The Court cited Section 23(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193467 as an example of a provision that aqthorizes 
the promulgation of legislative regulations. Section 23(a) provides 
that "[t]he [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall ... have 
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or 
appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter."68 Section 
602, under which federal agencies are "authorized and directed to 
effectuate" title VI's provisions,69 is a similar, if not more forceful, 
delegation of legislative power. The Court's illustrative reference in 
Gilbert, then, provides further support for characterizing title VI reg-
ulations as legislative. 
The debates on title VI supply even more compelling evidence 
that Congress intended to delegate legislative authority to the execu-
tive branch. Although Justices Powell's and Brennan's opinions in 
Bakke found support for the proposition that Congress intended to 
limit title Vi's definition of discrimination to the constitutional stan-
dard,70 contrary language can also be found.71 A review of the mas-
seems self-evident. If the law is to regulate conduct effectively, it must often be composed of 
complex and specific rules. Since Congress is not always capable of enacting sufficiently de-
tailed statutory language, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may delegate its 
law making authority to the executive branch so long as the separation of powers is preserved. 
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-26 (1944); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at§ 3.1; note 95 infra. 
64. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
65. 429 U.S. at 141. 
66. 429 U.S. at 141-42. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976). See 429 U.S. at 141. 
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). 
10. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. 
71. Some statements suggest that title VI and the Constitution were not intended to be 
coextensive. See, e.g., 110 CoNo. REc. 2467-68 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (''I believe 
there is a case in one of the courts of appeal [sic] which has held that 'separate but equal' as 
applicable to these hospital grants unconstitutional [sic]. That case has not yet been decided 
by the Supreme Court. By the enactment of title VI you override all such 'separate but equal' 
provisions for the future, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the pending litigation." (emphasis 
added)); id at 6544 (remarks of Senator Humphrey) ("The purpose of title VI is to make sure 
that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination. In many in-
stances the practices of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are unconsti-
tutional. . • . In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to national policy, and to the moral 
sense of the Nation." (emphasis added)). . 
Other remarks by legislators suggest that they thought title VI would incorporate a dispa-
rate impact standard. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) 
(quoting Presidential message to Congress of June 23, 1963, proposing the Civil Rights Act) 
("Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not 
be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimi-
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sive legislative record72 reveals a pervasive theme flatly inconsistent 
with the Justices' proposition: Congress chose to leave the task of 
defining and enforcing title VI's prohibition of discrimination to the 
executive branch.73 Both proponents and opponents of title VI un-
derstood that the statute allowed the executive branch to exercise 
broad discretion in defining what would constitute discrimination.74 
Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
for example, recognized that the bill assigned "[g]reat powers" to 
agency administrators.75 The extent of these powers was illustrated 
most clearly in a colloquy between Senator Ervin and Attorney Gen-
eral Kennedy before the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
Senator Ervin: So the rules which would have the farce and effect of law 
are to be developed .first in the minds of the administrators of the vari-
ous programs and then written in regulations and orders issued by 
them? 
Attorney General Kennedy: That is correct, Senator.76 
The House Judiciary Committee heard similar testimony.77 The 
wide latitude afforded the executive branch was bitterly criticized by 
the Act's foes, 78 but since Congress knowingly conferred such lati-
nation." (emphasis added)); id. at 1703 (remarks of Rep. Winstead) (''Title VI would authorize 
Federal agencies to withhold Federal financial support in connection with any program where 
there is racial discrimination in its application." (emphasis added)). 
12. See note 31 supra. 
13. See Abernathy, supra note 8, at 20-39. 
14. As Justice Brennan noted in Bakke, "[T]here was a strong emphasis throughout Con-
gress' consideration of title VI on providing the Executive Branch with considerable flexibility 
in interpreting and applying the prohibition against racial discrimination." 438 U.S. at 338-39 
(Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackm.un, JJ.). 
15. Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No . .5 of the House ComnL on the Judicial)', 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1520-21 (1963) [hereinafter House Subcomm Hearings]. 
16. Civil Rights - Tlte President's Program, 1963: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1963) (emphasis added). 
11. See House-Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 75, at 2765-66 (colloquy between Rep. Ma-
thias and Attorney General Kennedy). 
18. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2498 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Selden) ("[T]itle VI ..• gives 
Federal departments and agencies extending Federal financial assistance practically unlimited 
powers to dictate the implementation of any and all Federal programs within the States."); Id. 
at 1588 (remarks of Rep. Tuck) ("No one would know the law. It would be what these various 
agencies say it is, and the law would vary from agency to agency and from mouth to mouth."); 
HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 2436 (report of the Minority) ("It will be noted 
that the word "discrimination" is nowhere defined in the bill."); Id at 2453 ("Of all the harsh 
and unprecedented proposals contained in the bill, this title is the most radical departure ftom 
proper governmental policy." (emphasis in original)); 110 CoNG REc. 13,068 (1964) (remarks of 
Sen. Russell) (''Never has there been a bill before the Senate during my time here that has 
been so sweeping in its application or result. The bill leaves the definition of offenses against 
the law in the hands of the same officers who would prosecute for alleged violations ...• "); Id. 
at 5612 (remarks of Sen. Ervin) (''What constitutes unequal or unfair treatment? Section 601 
and Section 602 of title VI do not say. They leave the determination of that question to the 
executive department or agencies administering each program, without any guideline whatever 
to point out what is the congressional intent."); id at 12,320 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (''The 
casual reader of title VI may fail to grasp the full portent of its provisions. While the stated 
objective of title VI is meritorious, the depth of this title is almost beyond description. It 
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tude the agency regulations must be characterized as legislative and 
given the force and effect oflaw.79 
This characterization of the regulations issued under title VI as 
legislative was implicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Lau v. 
Nichols.80 Justice Douglas, who wrote the Court's opinion, assumed 
without discussion that title VI authorizes federal agencies to issue 
binding regulations.81 Similarly, Justice Stewart's concurring opin-
ion implied that HEW's enforcement regulations are legislative 
when it judged them against th~ lenient standard developed to test 
the validity oflegislative regulations.82 
The express delegation of authority in title VI, Congress' recogni-
tion that the executive branch would exercise substantive authority 
under the provision, and the Court's opinion in Lau, therefore, all 
confirm that the enforcement regulations are legislative. The impact 
standard that they impose is thus binding on courts so long as the 
agencies involved validly exercised their delegated power.83 
cannot be clearly delineated. It cannot be said that it goes so far and no farther. It has open-
ended provisions that virtually give it whatever depth and intensity a Federal bureaucrat may 
read into iL"). 
19. See authorities cited in note 55 supra. 
Two factors help explain Congress' decision to leave the task of defining discrimination to 
administrative officials. First, agencies would not be subject to static rules applicable to every 
executive department; instead, each agency could, over time, adopt regulations appropriate to 
its particular program. See, e.g., Hot/Se Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 75, at 2765-66 (testi-
mony of Atty. Gen. Ke~edy). Second, Congress was concerned with the "dilly-dallying" of 
federal judges in the fight against discrimination and consequently assigned primary enforce-
ment responsibility to agency administrators. See., e.g., id at 1523 (remarks of Rep. Celler). 
80. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
81. 414 U.S. at 566. 
82. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
83. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,295,308 (1979) (quoting National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,224 (1943)); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-
26 (1976); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at§ 7.8; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at § 59. 
Even if a court should erroneously conclude that the title VI enforcement regulations are 
interpretative rather than legislative, the agencies' choice of a disparate impact standard would 
still be entitled to a very high degree of judicial deference. "Courts give extra authoritative 
weight to interpretative rules . . . which are made contemporaneously with the enactment of 
the statute, which have been followed consistently over a long period, or which were outstand-
ing at the time of statutory reenactmenL" 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 64; see, e.g., Saxbe v. 
Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); NLRB 
v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1973). The title VI enforcement regulations satisfy each of 
these conditions. The regulations have not been modified since they were first promulgated in 
December, 1964. See 29 Fed. Reg. 16,273-309 (1964). Nor has Congress ever criticized or 
questioned these regulations, even though it has amended the statute since its original enact-
ment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976). In addition, the model regulations on which all of 
the agency regulations are based were drafted under the aegis of the Justice Department just a 
few months after title VI was enacted. The Justice Department's involvement is significant 
because it helped draft the language of title VI as well. See House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra 
note 75, at 2703 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Kennedy). An interpretation of a statute by adminis-
trators who participated in drafting it is entitled to particularly great weighL See Zuber v. 
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969). 
On the other hand, if these regulations are withdrawn, new regulations adopting an intent 
standard would be entitled to very little respect since they would contradict a previous, consis-
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The Supreme Court has recognized several related formulations 
for testing the validity of legislative regulations. "A reviewing court 
is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have 
interpreted the statute in a different manner."84 Legislative regula-
tions are invalid only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," or if the issuing 
agency exceeded its statutory authority.85 They will be upheld so 
long as they are "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation."86 But regulations that conflict with their statutory 
scheme will not be sustained even if they advance the legislation's 
goals.87 To assess the validity of the impact regulations promulgated 
under title VI, therefore, it is necessary to analyze the language, leg-
islative history, and policies of title VI. 88 
Title VI prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs, 
but it neither defines "discrimination" nor includes any criteria or 
standards that would narrow or withhold administrative discretion 
to identify the conduct subject to its proscription. 89 The statute 
merely commands federal agencies to issue rules and regulations ef-
tent, contemporaneous, and long-standing interpretation. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976). 
84. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1976). 
85. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1976) (quoting Administrative Procedure 
Act § IO(e), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C) (1976)). 
86. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring); Mourning v. 
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 
268, 280-81 (1969). 
87. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979); Note, SEC .Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Allomeys Under Rule 2(e), 79 MICH. L. Rev. 1270, 1281-82 (1981). 
88. Legislative regulations must also be properly promulgated. See 2 K. DA VIS, supra note 
53, at 36. The Administrative Procedure Act (1976) (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976), nor-
mally requires legislative rules to be published for notice and comment before final adoption. 
The title VI regulations are valid, even though many agencies did not publish them prior to 
adoption, because the APA exempts from its publication requirement rules and regulations 
"relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976). These title VI regulations apply only to the recipients 
of federal funds and thus come within this exception. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp., Cor-
vallis v. Mathews, 609 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1979); Housing Auth. v. United States Housing 
Auth., 468 F.2d 1, 9 (8$ Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973); Opelika Nursing Home, 
Inc. v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. 
Supp. 289, 295 (N.D. Ill. 1970), '!lfd. mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, 
at 169-70. 
There is also no question as to the regulations' constitutionality. The Supreme Court has 
held repeatedly that Congress and the agencies to which it has delegated authority may under 
the spending clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl 1, require recipients of federal funds to observe 
stricter standards of nondiscrimination than are required by the Constitution. See, e.g., Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980); Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 137-38 
(1979); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974). The only inquiry, therefore, is statutory. 
89. See Regents of the Univ. of Calv. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,284 (1978) (Powell, J.) ("The 
concept of 'discrimination' . . • is susceptible of varying interpretations. . • ."); 438 U.S. at 
337 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) ("[T]he legislative history [of title VI] 
shows that Congress specifically eschewed any static definition of discrimination. • • ."). 
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_fectuating its policy of nondiscrimination.90 
One provision suggests, however, that Congress did not mean to 
impose a rigid constitutional definition of discrimination on the 
agencies. Congress adopted an amendment, proposed by Represen-
tative Lindsay, that required all rules and regulations issued under 
title VI to be approved and signed by the President.91 Lindsay, a 
leading proponent of the Civil Rights Act,92 explained that agency 
rulemaking would be so critical in defining title Vi's reach that "the 
Chief Executive should be required to put his stamp of approval on 
such rules and regulations."93 As a procedural requirement imposed 
on agencies whose discretion is otherwise unconstrained by statutory 
limits, the Lindsay amendment indicates that Congress meant to al-
low the executive wide latitude in enforcing title VI. It seems doubt-
ful, moreover, that Representative Lindsay would have believed his 
amendment necessary had he understood the forthcoming regula-
tions to be restricted to a constitutional standard of discrimination. 
Notwithstanding Congress' intent to delegate the difficult task of 
defining discrimination to the executive branch,94 there was exten-
sive discussion concerning the uncertain object of title Vi's proscrip-
tion. The meaning of "discrimination" was a controversial issue. 
Opponents of the legislation expressed particular antipathy toward 
the possibility that it would be used to attack de facto as well as de 
jure discrimination.95 The legislative history reveals that Congress 
90. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (1976). 
91. 42 U.S.C. 2000d-l (1976). 
92. Rep. Lindsay, a member of the Judiciary Committee, was an active participant in the 
House debate on title VI. See lIO CONG. REc. 2797 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Conte). 
93. 110 CONG. REc. 2499 (1964). 
94. Congress was within its constitutional authority when it delegated the task of defining 
"discrimination" to the executive branch. The Supreme Court has invalidated Congress' dele-
gation of authority to the executive in only two cases, both decided in 1935. See A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935). Since then the Court has upheld every challenged delegation, including 
several broader than that contained in section 602. See, e.g., American Trucking Assn. v. 
United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). A delegation of 
authority will be sustained so long as Congress expresses a guiding principle against which 
administrative action can be measured. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 
(1944). Title VI and its legislative history explicitly identify the problem which concerned 
Congress: unequal treatment of blacks and other minorities in government-funded programs. 
Moreover, courts have recently confirmed Congress' power to mandate that agencies define 
statutory terms. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1981); Batterton 
v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712, 
717 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 797 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Thus, 
whatever the current limit, if any, on Congress' power to delegate legislative-type authority to 
the executive branch, see generally I K. DAVIS, supra note ?3, at§ 3.1; McGowan, Congress, 
Court, and Control of .Delegated Power, 11 CoLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977); Wright, Book Review, 
81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972j, Congress was within its constitutional authority when it delegated the 
responsily.lity for defining "discrimination." 
95. See, e.g., HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 2, at 2436 (report of the minority); 
Abernathy, supra note 8, at 26-30. 
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was aware of the likelihood that the Johnson administration would 
use title VI in exactly that way.96 The Minority Report of the House 
Judiciary Committee, for example, bitterly predicted that the admin-
istration would act to ~'remove the effects of previous practices" in its 
quest to attain "racial balance."97 Yet neither the statute nor the 
legislative history suggests that Congress meant to preclude this pos-
sibility. Indeed, the political controversy over the question may fur-
ther explain Congress' willingness to charge another branch of 
government with responsibility for resolving the issue. Regulations 
that include an impact standard for defining discrimination cannot, 
therefore, be considered contrary to congressional intent. 
Agency adoption of a disparate impact standard is also consistent 
with the goals of title VI. As one Congressman observed, "Title VI 
enunciates what always should have been the policy of the United 
States - that no person should pe denied equal benefits under any 
federal financial assistance program because of his race, color, reli-
gion or national origin."98 While the proof problems that attend the 
application of an intent standard may prevent the full realization of 
this goal, the disparate impact standard prohibits both intentional 
discrimination and facially neutral practices that have a discrimina-
tory effect. Accordingly, it advances the policy of title VI by ensur-
ing that administrators of federally funded programs are sensitive to 
the discriminatory impact of their actions. 
In explicitly conferring on the executive branch the authority and 
responsibility to issue enforcement rules and regulations under title 
VI, Congress gave administrative agencies the power to promulgate 
rules with legislative effect. These regulations, which adopt a dispa-
rate impact standard of discrimination, are consistent with the text, 
legislative history, and policy of the statute.99 Since consistency with 
96. See, e.g.,House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 75, at 1512, 1519 (testimony of HEW 
Secretary Celebrezze). 
97. HousE JUDICIARY Rl!roRT, supra note 2, at 2436 (report of the minority) (emphasis 
added). 
98. 110 CoNo. REc. 1594 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Farbstein). 
99. Congress' adoption in the 1970's of statutes prohibiting discrimination on account of 
sex, Education Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX,§ 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)) (prohibiting sex discrimination in certain educational programs), 
handicap, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 393 (codified 
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. m 1979)), or age, Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
135, tit. III,§ 303, 89 Stat. 728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976)), also supports the view that 
title VI was not intended to incorporate a constitutional prohibition of discrimination. The 
language of these measures was clearly patterned after that used in title VI, yet it is very 
unlikely that Congress intended thereby to incorporate only a constitutional standard of dis-
crimination since the Constitution has been interpreted to afford only minimal. protection 
against these forms of discrimination. The better view is that in modeling these statutes after 
title VI, Congress ''understood the phraseology and pattern already employed in title VI to 
allow agencies to attack discriminatory actions that do not violate judicial conceptions of con-
stitutional equal protection." Abernathy, supra note 8, at 38. 
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the enabling statute renders legislative regulations valid, courts must 
enforce an impact standard in title VI litigation. 
Adoption of a disparate impact standard in title VI suits might 
pose practical problems. Minorities could more easily challenge the 
decisions of governmental officials since any program with a dispa-
rate effect on a protected class would be vulnerable under title VI. 
Consequently, courts may be placed in the uncomfortable position of 
having to review the day-to-day decisions of administrative arid 
political entities.100 
Nevertheless, an appropriate allocation of evidentiary burdens 
would ameliorate this problem. Initially, a plaintiffs proof of dispa-
rate impact should establish a prima facie title VI violation.101 The 
defendant then should have an opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's 
showing. The defendant's rebuttal should include a showing that a 
rational procedure, including consideration of available alternatives, 
led to the challenged decision.102 Two recent title VI cases in the 
courts of appeals suggest that any further requirement need not be 
onerous. In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 103 the Third Circuit 
indicated that a defendant's rebuttal burden was one of production 
rather than persuasion.104 Under this test, producing evidence that 
the disparate impact results from the pursuit of a legitimate govern-
mental interest should enable the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's 
prima facie case. · 
In Bryan v. Koch, 105 the Second Circuit did not clearly enunciate 
the nature of the defendant's task once the plaintiffs had established 
their prima facie. case, though an earlier decision in the circuit had 
imposed a burden of persuasion ·in analogous civil rights litiga-
tion.106 The Bryan majority did indicate that title VI defendants 
need not account for their failure to choose an alternative to the 
challenged decision.107 Judge Newman's majority opinion expressed 
extreme reluctance to intrude on administrative and legislative func-
tions by independently assessing other options.108 Yet as Judge 
Kearse pointed out in a separate opinion, courts may provide mean-
100. See generally, NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1339 (3d Cir. 1981) (en 
bane) (Adams, J., concurring); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 1980). 
101. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane); 
Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., concurring); cf. Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977) (disparate impact establishes prima facie title VIl case). 
102. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., concurring). 
103. 657 F.2d 1322, 1339 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane). 
104. 657 F.2d at 1334-36. 
105. 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980). 
106. See Vulcan Socy. of New York City Fire Dept. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490 F.2d 387, 
393 (2d Cir. 1973). 
107. See 627 F.2d at 618-19. 
108. See 627 F.2d at 619. 
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ingful review without risking 'judicial usurpation of executive pre-
rogatives inherent in any review of the substance of the decision" by 
requiring that decisions result from processes that demonstrably in-
clude consideration of altematives.109 An impact standard, there-
fore, need not hamstring policy makers or present insurmountable 
problems of judicial administration. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts considering suits brought under title VI must use the stan-
dard of nondiscrimination specified in the enforcement regulations 
issued by the funding agency. In enacting title VI, Congress dele-
gated to the executive branch broad authority to define and enforce 
title Vi's prohibition of discrimination. The executive branch has 
responded by promulgating regulations that prohibit disparate im-
pact in federally funded programs. These regulations are legislative 
in nature and within the scope of the enabling statute. Hence, they 
carry the force of law and are binding upon the courts. 
109. See 627 F.2d at 623-28 (Kearse, J., dissenting in part). 
